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Abstract
With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can
now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-
correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make
an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model that corresponds to such a setting is the
wire tap channel introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for
wire tap channels. We provide an alternative view of the proof for secrecy capacity of wire tap channels and show
how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider
binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel and propose specific
practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide security
at rates below secrecy capacity. For the special case of a noiseless main channel and binary erasure channel, we
consider encoder and decoder design for codes achieving secrecy on the wiretap channel; we show that it is possible
to construct linear-time decodable secrecy codes based on LDPC codes that achieve secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The notion of communication with perfect security was defined in information-theoretic terms by Shannon [1].
Suppose a k-bit message M is to be transmitted securely from Alice to Bob across a public channel. Perfect
security is said to be achieved if the encoding of M into a transmitted word X is such that the mutual information
I(M;X) = 0. From this definition, Shannon concluded that Alice and Bob should necessarily share k bits of key
for achieving perfect security.
An alternative notion of communication with security was introduced by Wyner [2]. Wyner introduced the wire
tap channel, which has matured into a system depicted in Fig. 1. In a wire tap channel, the honest parties Alice
and Bob are separated by a channel C1 called the main channel. The important modification when compared to
Shannon’s study of security is that any eavesdropper Eve observes information transmitted by Alice through another
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2channel C2 called the wiretapper’s channel. C1 and C2 are assumed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs).
Suppose Alice and Bob try to (securely) communicate a k-bit message M across C1. Alice encodes M into an
Alice X
Eve
C2
C1 Bob
Z
YM
Fig. 1. Wire tap channel.
n-bit transmitted word X. The legitimate receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve receive X through two different
channels C1 and C2, respectively. Bob’s and Eve’s observations are denoted Y and Z, respectively. Alice’s encoding
should achieve two objectives: (1) [Security] In words, Z should provide no information about M. The precise
formulation used in this paper is that the rate of mutual information 1
n
I(M;Z) → 0 as n → ∞ (2) [Reliability]
Y can be decoded into M with negligibly small probability of error. Wyner showed that both objectives can be
attained by forward coding without any key bits if the channels C1 and C2 satisfy some conditions. The rate k/n
is called the secrecy rate.
Secrecy capacity of a wire tap channel is the largest k/n for which the objectives of secure and reliable
communication is achievable. Secrecy capacity is a function of the channels C1 and C2. If the capacity of C1
is greater than the capacity of C2, one would intuitively expect secrecy capacity to be positive. This intuition has
been justified in several cases. Wyner [2] showed that if C2 is a degraded version of C1 (C2 is C1 concatenated
with another DMC) then secrecy capacity is positive. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] showed that the secrecy capacity is
positive for the cases when C1 is “less noisy” than C2. However, computing secrecy capacity of a general wire
tap channel efficiently given DMCs C1 and C2 still remains an unsolved problem. The most recent progress in this
problem was made by Van Dijk [4].
The key distribution problem in wire tap channels, which falls under the general problem of key generation from
correlated source outputs, has been studied extensively [5], [6], [7]. The objective of secure key distribution is for
Alice and Bob to share a common k-bit key about which Eve’s entropy is maximal. In key distribution, the k bits
can be unknown to Alice before transmission. Powerful ideas such as common randomness, advantage distillation
and privacy amplification were developed in the context of key distribution over wire tap channels [7], [8]. Several
key distribution protocols have been developed and studied; many of the protocols make use of a parallel, error-free
public channel between Alice and Bob during implementation.
The problem of developing forward coding schemes (with no parallel channel) for secure communication over
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3wire tap channels has not received much attention. Some examples of coding schemes have been provided in [2]
and [5]. A condition for constructing codes for the modified wire tap channel, introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [9],
has been studied by Wei [10]. Code construction methods and their connection to security have not been extensively
explored so far. However, existence of coding schemes for various generalized wire tap channel scenarios has been
proved by several authors recently [11], [12], [13]. In particular, the existence of coding methods based on LDPC
codes has been shown in [13].
In this paper, we focus on the problem of developing coding schemes for secure communication across wire
tap channels. We begin by discussing the secrecy capacity theorem for certain wire tap channels. We provide a
careful reworking of the proof so that the requirements of security and reliability are separated. We generalize an
important link between capacity-approaching codes and security. This alternative view of the proof provides a clear
construction method for coding schemes for secure communication across arbitrary wire tap channels.
Later, we use this idea to develop codes for different wire tap channels. For a wire tap channel with a noiseless
main channel and a binary erasure channel (BEC) as the wire tapper’s channel, we provide codes that achieve secrecy
capacity using the threshold properties of codes on graphs under message passing decoding. To our knowledge,
these are the first codes that achieve secrecy capacity over wire tap channels. Using this construction, we show that
it is possible to construct linear-time decodable codes that achieve security over such wire tap channels. Next, we
extend the construction to wire tap channels that have BECs as both the main and wiretapper’s channel. We show
important connections between the threshold of codes on graphs under message-passing decoding and security.
Finally, we consider a wire tap channel with a noiseless main channel and a binary symmetric channel (BSC) as
the wiretapper’s channel. For this case, we provide a coding solution using codes that have good error-detecting
capability.
Throughout the paper, the criterion for security is that the mutual information between the message and an
eavesdropper’s observables goes to zero rate-wise. Note that this formulation (originally due to Wyner [2]) is
weaker than the accepted security criteria in contemporary work in cryptography, which typically require the total
mutual information to go to zero. Hence, this work can be seen as a conceptual advancement in the area of forward
coding for wire tap channels. With future study, stronger security criterion such as exponential fall in mutual
information could become possible for such codes over a wire tap channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we briefly discuss secrecy capacity for wire tap
channels and point out the connection between capacity-approaching codes and secrecy. In Section III, we discuss
the general coding scheme for wire tap channels used in the remainder of the paper. In Section IV, we present codes
for wire tap channels with a noiseless main channel and a BEC as the wiretapper’s channel; in Section V, we modify
the above codes and extend them to construct linear-time decodable codes for these wire tap channels. In Section
VI, we present codes for wire tap channels with BECs as both main and wiretapper’s channels. In Section VII,
we present code constructions for wire tap channels with a noiseless main channel and a BSC as the wiretapper’s
channel. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII with a discussion of results and topics for future research.
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4II. CODING FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL
In a general wire tap channel (Fig. 1), C1 and C2 are discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). The two DMCs
have the same input alphabet but different output alphabet. C1 is denoted X → Y , where X is a random variable
denoting an input symbol to C1, and Y is a random variable denoting an output symbol from C1. Similarly, C2
is denoted X → Z . A sequence of n input symbols is denoted by Xn or X. Y n and Y, and Zn and Z have
similar notations for the outputs. C1 and C2 of a wire tap channel are called the main channel and wire tap channel,
respectively.
A. Secrecy capacity of the wire tap channel
The notion of secrecy capacity, as introduced by Wyner [2], has an operational meaning of being the maximum
possible rate of information transmission between Alice and Bob that still enables Eve to be kept totally ignorant.
Before defining the operational meaning precisely, we look at the calculation of secrecy capacity for a given wire
tap channel. The secrecy capacity Cs for a general wire tap channel can be calculated as follows [3]:
Cs = max
V→X→(Y,Z)
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] , (1)
where the maximum is over all possible random variables V in joint distribution with X , Y and Z such that
V → X → (Y, Z) is a Markov chain. The random variable V does not have a direct physical meaning; it is used
for calculation purposes. Note that Cs could turn out to be zero or negative in some cases. At present, the calculation
of secrecy capacity is an unsolved problem when C1 and C2 are general DMCs. However, the calculation of secrecy
capacity can be simplified for some special cases that impose restrictions on the wire tap channel with respect to
the main channel.
If I(V ;Y ) ≥ I(V ;Z) for all Markov chains V → X → (Y, Z), the main channel is said to be less noisy than
the wire tap channel. If the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel [3], then
Cs = max
PX(x)
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] , (2)
where the maximum is over all possible distributions PX(x) of X . Moreover, as shown in [4], I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)
is a convex function of PX(x) when the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel; hence, the secrecy
capacity can be calculated using convex optimization methods. It was further shown in [4] that if I(X ;Y ) and
I(X ;Z) are individually maximized by the same PX(x), and the main channel (X → Y ) is less noisy than the
wire tap channel (X → Z), then
Cs = Capacity(X → Y )− Capacity(X → Z), (3)
where Capacity(.) refers to the usual channel capacity.
B. Coding method
The coding problem for Alice in the wire tap channel involves adding redundancy for enabling Bob to correct
errors (across the main channel) and adding randomness for keeping Eve ignorant (across the wire tap channel). The
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5coding method presented here is not new. It is present in the proofs in [2] and [3]. More recently, similar coding
methods have been used in [11], [12] for finding bounds and error exponents in the context of wire tap channels.
However, our method of proof separates the requirements of security and reliability and results in a simple design
method for codes over a wire tap channel.
Let us assume that Alice needs to transmit one out of M equally likely messages i.e. a message denoted u is
such that u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} and Prob{u = i} = 1/M . Alice uses M codes Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ M with |Ci| = L
and block-length n. Each codeword of Ci consists of n symbols from the input alphabet of the main or wire tap
channel. We let the common input alphabet to the two channels be {1, 2, · · · ,K}. A symbol of the input alphabet
is denoted k. A message u is encoded into a transmitted word x as follows: x is chosen uniformly at random from
the code Cu. The coding method is illustrated in Fig. 2. The transmitted word x , in general, belongs to the overall
code C = ∪iCi. The rate of information transmission from Alice to Bob (in terms of bits per channel use) in such
a setting is given by log2M/n. The receiver on the main channel (Bob) decodes a received word y with respect
to the overall code C into a decoded message uˆ (say, by Maximum-Likelihood (MaxL) decoding).
x ∈ Cu
Encoder
Wire Tap
Channel
Main
Channel
x y
z
DecoderAlice Bob
Eve
uˆu
Fig. 2. Coding method for the wire tap channel.
The objective of Alice and Bob in a wire tap channel can now be given a precise definition. Let U, Uˆ, and Z
be random variables denoting Alice’s message, Bob’s decoded message, and Eve’s received word, respectively. Let
H(V ) represent the entropy of a random variable V . Then, the objective is to achieve the following:
Prob{U 6= Uˆ} → 0. (4)
I(U;Z)/n → 0. (5)
The constraint (5) is referred to as the security constraint, while (4) is called the reliability constraint. If an encoder
(as in Fig. 2) with Rs = log2M/n satisfies the security and reliability constraints for a given wire tap channel,
then such an encoder is said to achieve a secrecy rate Rs.
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6C. Security of the coding method
The security constraint is of paramount importance in the design of an encoder for a wire tap channel. The
following choice of the codes Cu satisfies the security constraint: Each Cu should approach capacity over the wire
tapper’s channel (similar to the special case considered by Wyner in [2]). We present the criterion in the following
theorem (the notation used is from Fig. 2 and Section II-B).
Theorem 1: If each code Cu, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} comes from a sequence of codes that approach capacity
asymptotically over the wire tap channel, then I(U;Z)/n→ 0, as n→∞.
Proof: Since each Cu approaches the capacity Cw of the wire tapper’s channel, we have for any ǫ > 0 an nǫ
such that for n > nǫ, I(X;Z|U = u)/n ≥ CW − ǫ for each u. Therefore for n > nǫ, I(X;Z|U)/n ≥ CW − ǫ.
Expanding I(Z;UX) in two ways, we get
I(Z;UX) = I(U;Z) + I(X;Z|U) = I(X;Z) + I(U;Z|X).
Since U→ X→ Z is a Markov chain, I(U;Z|X) = 0. Therefore for n > nǫ we have
I(U;Z)/n = I(X;Z)/n− I(X;Z|U)/n ≤ CW − (CW − ǫ) = ǫ.
This fundamental connection between capacity-approaching codes and secrecy has been used in many works on
wire tap channels beginning with [2] implicitly. In Appendix I, we show that this connection can be used to design
codes that approach the secrecy capacity of certain wire tap channels. Particularly, we have shown that the reliability
condition can be satisfied while simultaneously forcing each code Cu to approach capacity.
In summary, we have shown that secrecy capacity can be achieved for certain wire tap channels using codes
that achieve capacity over the wire tapper’s channel. A significant drawback is that capacity-achieving codes are
essential for guaranteeing the security of the method. Since capacity-achieving codes are not practical in many
settings, design of practical codes that are secure is an important problem that needs to be addressed. If the resulting
code is practical and secure, transmission rates below secrecy capacity are certainly acceptable. The remainder of
this paper is concerned with developing practical codes and protocols for wire tap channels. In some simple settings,
practical methods that achieve secrecy capacity are given.
III. CODE DESIGN FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL
In this section, we study the design and use of linear codes over a wire tap channel. We use a method that was
first introduced and studied by Wyner and Ozarow [2], [9] for two specific cases. We have extended Wyner’s study
by considering other wire tap channels. We have also provided better, implementable codes for the cases studied
by Wyner.
A. Coding method
We consider a coding method similar to Fig. 2 but with linear codes and cosets. To transmit k-bit messages, we
first select a (n, l) linear binary code C such that k ≤ n− l. Out of the 2n−l cosets of C, we choose 2k cosets and
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7let each message correspond to a chosen coset. The selection of the cosets is done in a linear fashion. Suppose G
is a generator matrix for C with rows g1, g2, · · · , and gl. We select k linearly independent vectors h1, h2, · · · ,
and hk from {0, 1}n \ C. The coset corresponding to a k-bit message s = [s1 s2 · · · sk] is determined as follows:
s→ s1h1 + s2h2 + · · ·+ skhk + C. (6)
Though the above correspondence is deterministic, the encoding procedure has a random component in the selection
of the transmitted word. A k-bit message s is encoded into a n-bit word randomly selected from the coset of C
corresponding to s. Hence, the transmitted word, x, is given by
x = s1h1 + s2h2 + · · ·+ skhk + v1g1 + v2g2 + · · ·+ vlgl,
where v = [v1 v2 · · · vl] is an uniformly random l-bit vector. The overall encoding operation can be described as a
matrix multiplication. Let G∗ be the k × n matrix with rows h1, h2, · · · , and hk. Then,
x = [s v]

G∗
G

 .
Hence, x belongs to the code C with generator matrix
G =

G∗
G

 .
The goal of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is to determine s from their respective received
vectors. Restating the conditions of Section II-B, the design of the codes C and C should be such that (1) s can be
determined without error across the main channel, and (2) every s is equally likely across the wiretapper’s channel.
Guided by the results of the previous sections, we could choose C as a capacity-achieving code over the
wiretapper’s channel. However, designing a code C that can be decoded across the main channel is still a challenge.
Moreover, capacity-achieving codes have not yet been demonstrated in practice for many channels. In the following
sections, we look at some design approaches for some simple wire tap channels. The encoding method and notation
will remain the same for all cases.
IV. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER’S CHANNEL
We begin with the simplest possible wire tap channel with a binary erasure channel (BEC) as the wiretapper’s
channel and a noiseless main channel. This scenario is shown in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, the wiretapper’s channel has
been denoted BEC(1− ǫ) i.e. the probability of erasure in the wiretapper’s channel is 1− ǫ. The probability that a
bit is leaked to the wiretapper is ǫ. This notation has been chosen for future convenience. We will denote the wire
tap channel of Fig. 3 as EWT(ǫ). Using (3), we see that the secrecy capacity of an EWT(ǫ) is
Cs = 1− Capacity(BEC(1 − ǫ)) = 1− (1− (1− ǫ)) = 1− ǫ. (7)
The coding method across an EWT(ǫ) is illustrated in Fig. 4. In the figure, S is the random variable denoting
the k-bit message to be transmitted. The code C is chosen to be an (n, n− k) code, and the code C is chosen to
October 22, 2018 DRAFT
8Alice XS Bob
Y
Eve
Z
BEC(1 − ǫ)
Fig. 3. Wire tap channel denoted EWT(ǫ).
X S
Bob
Z
Eavesdropper
XS
Alice
H: parity-check matrix of C
Encoder S = HXT
BEC(1 − ǫ)seclected from
X: Randomly
coset of a code C
with syndrome S
Fig. 4. Coding method.
be the entire vector space {0, 1}n. The transmitted n-tuple is denoted by the random variable X = [X1 X2 · · ·Xn].
Note that the message S can be seen as a syndrome of C with respect to a carefully constructed k×n parity-check
matrix H . Since the channel between Alice and Bob is error-free, Bob finds the message as follows: S = HXT
(mod 2). The secret information rate is R = k/n. From (7), we see that for secure transmission,
R = k/n < 1− ǫ. (8)
Assuming that all messages are equally likely, we have Xi = 0 or Xi = 1 with probability 1/2 each. The
eavesdropper learns Xi with probability ǫ. That is, the random variable Z = [Z1 Z2 · · ·Zn] is such that Zi = Xi
with probability ǫ, and Zi =? (unknown or erasure) with probability 1− ǫ.
A. Security Criterion
To develop a security criterion for the choice of C, we calculate the eavesdropper’s uncertainty H(S|Z) by
first evaluating H(S|Z = z). Note that the eavesdropper is given complete knowledge of the code C and infinite
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9computational power. The main source of uncertainty is the uniformly random selection of the transmitted word X
from the coset of C corresponding to the message S.
If a coset of C contains at least one vector that agrees with z ∈ {0, 1, ?}n in the unerased positions, we say that
the coset is consistent with z. Each consistent coset corresponds to a possible message for the eavesdropper. Let v
be a vector consistent with z in the coset v+C. Let S be the set of all vectors in v+C consistent with z. Then,
v + S is the set of all vectors in C with zeros in the positions revealed in z. That is,
v + S = {u ∈ C : ui = 0 whenever zi 6=?}.
Since |S| = |v+S|, the number of vectors consistent with z in each consistent coset is a constant equal to the size
of the set on the RHS above.
Let N(C, z) denote the total number of cosets of C consistent with z. Since each message is equally likely a
priori, we get
H(S|Z = z) = log2N(C, z). (9)
For an (n, n−k) code C, the maximum possible value for N(C, z) is the total number of cosets 2k. If N(C, z) =
2k, we say that z is secured by C since the eavesdropper’s Prob{S = s|Z = z} = 1/2k for every possible message
s. The following theorem (adapted from [9, Lemma 3]) states a condition for a vector z to be secured by a code
C.
Theorem 2 (Ozarow, Wyner ’84): Let an (n, n − k) code C have a generator matrix G = [a1 · · · an], where ai
is the i-th column of G. Consider an instance of the eavesdropper’s observation z ∈ {0, 1, ?}n with µ unerased
positions given by {i : zi 6=?} = {i1, i2, · · · , iµ}. z is secured by C iff the matrix Gµ = [ai1ai2 · · · aiµ ] has rank
µ.
Proof: If Gµ has rank µ, the code C has all 2µ possible µ-tuples in the µ unerased positions. So each coset
of C also has all 2µ possible µ-tuples in the µ revealed positions. So N(C, z) = 2k.
If Gµ has rank less than µ, the code C does not have all µ-tuples in the µ unerased positions. So there exists at
least one coset that does not contain a given µ-tuple in the µ unerased positions, and N(C, z) < 2k.
If a random vector obtained over a BEC(1 − ǫ) is secured with probability close to one by an (n, n− k) code C,
rate k/n is achievable with secrecy over an EWT(ǫ).
B. Using duals of codes on graphs
We now study the use of the threshold property of codes on graphs for providing security over an erasure wire
tap channel. We illustrate the method using Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes. The extension to other codes
on graphs is shown in examples.
Consider a bipartite graph ensemble Cn(λ, ρ) with n left nodes and left and right edge degree distribution
polynomials λ(x) =
∑
i≥1 λix
i−1 and ρ(x) =
∑
i≥1 ρix
i−1
, respectively [14]. The coefficients λi (respectively,
ρi) denotes the probability that a randomly chosen edge in the Tanner graph of the code is incident on a variable
(respectively, check) node of degree i. The adjacency matrix of a graph from the ensemble provides the parity-check
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matrix of a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code. Let the threshold for Cn(λ, ρ) over the binary erasure channel
be α∗(λ, ρ). The threshold property has the following straight-forward interpretation:
Theorem 3: Let M be a parity-check matrix of an LDPC code from the ensemble Cn(λ, ρ). A submatrix formed
by selecting columns of M independently with probability α will have full column rank for α < α∗(λ, ρ) for large
k with high probability.
Theorem 3 enables the use of duals of LDPC codes as the code C over an EWT(ǫ) as shown in Fig. 4. We let
a matrix M from the ensemble Cn(λ, ρ) to be the generator matrix for C. By Theorem 3, the columns of the
matrix M corresponding to the leaked bits over a BEC(1 − ǫ) will have full rank with high probability whenever
ǫ < α∗(λ, ρ). Note that the probability that a bit is leaked across a BEC(1− ǫ) is equal to ǫ. In combination with
Theorem 2, we see that the code C with generator matrix M provides complete security with probability tending
to one for large block-length over an EWT(ǫ) with ǫ < α∗(λ, ρ).
Example 1: The Cn(x2, x5) ensemble of (3, 6)-regular LDPC codes has threshold α∗(x2, x5) ≈ 0.42. Let M
be an adjacency matrix from the ensemble with large n (say, n > 105). M is an n/2× n binary matrix with row
weight 3 and column weight 6. The (n, n/2) code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT(ǫ) for
ǫ < 0.42 with secrecy. The information rate between the honest parties in this case is R = 0.5 compared to the
upper bound of 1− ǫ = 0.58 (from (8)). (In practice, the value of ǫ could be reasonably lesser than 0.42 for added
security.)
The above argument can be extended to other ensembles of codes on graphs that have capacity-achieving
thresholds over the binary erasure channel. We illustrate the method with the following example.
Example 2 (Tornado codes): A rate-2/3 tornado code ensemble with threshold δ = 0.33257 has been reported
in [15]. A parity-check matrix M for a code from the ensemble will have dimensions n/3× n. The (n, n− 2/3n)
code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT(ǫ) for ǫ < 0.33257 with secrecy. The information rate
between the honest parties in this case is R = 2/3 = 0.66666... compared to the upper bound of 1− ǫ = 0.66743.
Similar examples using the other classes of capacity-approaching ensembles can be constructed. Hence over an
erasure wire-tap channel with wire-tap probability ǫ, secure information transmission rates tending to the upper
bound of 1 − ǫ are achievable using duals of codes on graphs that approach capacity over the binary erasure
channel.
Note that the code C has properties that are opposite to the requirements of Section II-B. While we had proposed
to use a code that is capacity-achieving over the wiretapper’s channel in Section II-B, we have used the dual of
a capacity-achieving code when the wiretapper’s channel is a BEC. In fact, using the dual appears to be a more
powerful method since security does not depend on capacity-achieving codes. This observation agrees with the
results of [9], and both possibilities are worth exploring in other wire tap channels.
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Fig. 5. The encoding procedure
V. EFFICIENTLY DECODABLE SECRECY CODES FOR NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAP
CHANNEL SYSTEMS
The main advantage of using LDPC codes for error correction over regular erasure channels is that the decoding
algorithm is of linear complexity in blocklength [14]. This property can be extended to the use of LDPC codes
over the erasure wire tap channels as well. We now discuss designing linear-time decodable secrecy codes for the
system shown in Fig. 3, where the main channel is noiseless and the wiretap channel is a BEC.
In the previous section, we showed how to use dual codes of LDPC codes to construct secrecy codes for this
system. The cosets of a dual code of an LDPC code are used to send secret messages. Let C be an LDPC code.
Let G be the generator matrix of C⊥ (i.e. the parity check matrix of C), and H be the parity check matrix of C⊥
(i.e. the generator matrix of C). G is a sparse matrix since C is an LDPC code. As we discussed in the previous
sections, a coset of C is indexed by a secret message S and the transmitted word X is a randomly chosen word
from that coset. Let C have rate r, and let G∗ be the matrix containing the rest of the independent vectors in
{0, 1}n (as in Section III-A). In Fig. 5, we show the matrices G and G∗, and the method for encoding an nr-bit
secret message. The bits {si}nr1 are the secret bits, and the bits {vi}
n(1−r)
1 are chosen at random. {xi}n1 are the
transmitted bits. We refer to the secret bits, random bits and transmitted bits as s-bits, v-bits and x-bits, respectively.
We now consider the decoding problem for Bob. Suppose G has rows g1, g2, · · · , and gn(1−r). We select nr
linearly independent rows h1, h2, · · · , and hnr from {0, 1}n \C. Let G∗ be the matrix with rows as h1, h2, · · · ,
and hnr. Let the matrix [G∗T , GT ] be defined as,
[G∗T , GT ] = [hT1 ,h
T
2 , · · · ,h
T
nr,g
T
1 ,g
T
2 , · · · ,g
T
n(1−r)].
Let W be defined as W = [S,V]T , where S is the secret message, and V is a random vector. The transmitted
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word XT is now given by,
XT = [G∗T , GT ]W. (10)
The decoding problem for Bob is to determine W (or just S) from (10); this can be easily seen to be a O(n2)
operation.
We defined H to be a parity check matrix of the code C⊥ above. An equivalent way of finding S is for Bob
to compute the syndrome HXT . For a suitable choice of H , one could have S = HXT . However, since H is a
dense matrix (in general), the complexity of this decoding is also likely to be O(n2).
We now ask the following question. Is it possible to achieve linear or almost-linear decoding complexity for Bob
by carefully choosing a subset of the set of all the cosets of C? In other words, can we sacrifice some secrecy rate
to achieve linear or almost-linear decoding complexity for Bob? As we will discuss later, our approach will be to
make some of the elements of S always equal to zero. This will decrease our secrecy rate, but we will show that
almost-linear or linear time decoding becomes possible in that case.
We first show that the decoding problem in (10) is similar to the problem of systematic encoding of linear block
codes. Let a linear block code have parity check matrix H , where H = [H1, H2]. Let the transmitted codeword be
c = [mT ,pT ]T , where m is the message and p is the parity part. Hence, to find p, the encoder has to solve
−H1m = H2p. (11)
Equation (10) is similar to (11) if we let XT = −H1m, H2 = [G∗T , GT ], and W = p. In [14], the authors have
shown how to efficiently solve (11) for LDPC codes. As in [14], our approach will be to multiply (10) by a matrix
Q to get
QXT = Q[G∗T , GT ]W. (12)
To make the operation of finding W from the above equation O(n), we need to have the matrix Q[G∗T , GT ] in a
special form, and we need to ensure that QXT is a O(n) operation.
A. Choosing a subset of the set of cosets
Let G1 be a sparse, full row-rank matrix whose rows form a the set of linearly independent vectors in the
row-space of G∗. Let G1 have dimensions n(r − t)× n. We show this in Fig. 6. Let P be the matrix whose rows
are the rest of the independent vectors in {0, 1}n. Let H∗ be defined as shown in the figure, and let H∗ be the
parity check matrix of an LDPC code C∗. H∗ has dimensions n(1− t)× n. Hence, C∗ has rate t. It can be seen
that, if G corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair (λG, ρG), and G1 corresponds to a Tanner
graph with degree distribution pair (λG1 , ρG1 ), then H∗ corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair
(λH∗ , ρH∗ ), where
λH∗(x)∫ 1
0
λH∗ (x)dx
=
1∫ 1
0
λG(x)dx
∫ 1
0
λG1(x)dx
(
λG(x)
∫
λG1(x)dx + λG1(x)
∫
λG(x)dx
)
, (13)
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Fig. 6. Choosing a subset of the set of cosets
and
ρH∗(x) =
∫ 1
0 λG(x)dx∫ 1
0
λG(x)dx +
∫ 1
0
λG1(x)dx
ρG1(x) +
∫ 1
0 λG1(x)dx∫ 1
0
λG(x)dx +
∫ 1
0
λG1(x)dx
ρG(x). (14)
See Appendix II for a proof of the above relations. We restrict the transmitted word X to be a linear combination
of the rows in only G and G1, i.e. all the vectors in P are multiplied by zero. The secrecy code rate now falls to
r− t. It is important to note that this new secrecy code will have the same security properties as the original code,
since only the matrix G determines the security properties of the secrecy code.
1) Forming the matrix H1: Let the code C∗ have erasure threshold β under the standard iterative erasure-decoding
algorithm. Hence, any submatrix formed using a set of nβ columns of the n×n matrix in Fig. 6 (i.e. including G,
G1 and P ) will have full column rank (asymptotically). By performing some row and column permutations in G,
G1 and P , we can get an approximately upper triangular form in H∗. Note that, after row and column permutations,
we need to rearrange the v-bits, s-bits and the x-bits. To keep the notation simple we will still call the first n(1−r)
bits v-bits and the next n(r− t) bits as s-bits with the understanding that Bob now will possibly have to find some
or all of the bits in not only S, but also in V. After the row and column permutations we continue to call the
matrices G, G1 and P by the same names.
Now, consider Fig. 7. The matrix H1 is obtained by retaining the nβ columns in the approximate upper triangular
form and by choosing n(1− t−β) other columns in such a way that H1 has full column rank in the column-space
of G and G1. Thus, H1 will have full column rank in the full n× n matrix (G, G1, and P ) as well.
2) Forming the matrix H: In Fig. 8, we show the matrix H , which is obtained by rotating the matrix H1 in
Fig. 7 by 90 degrees clockwise. The equation (shown in Fig. 8)
H [sn(r−t) · · · s1 vn(1−r) · · · v1]
T = [x1 x2 · · ·xn(1−t)]
T
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Fig. 7. The matrix H1
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nβ
Fig. 8. The matrix H
needs to be solved to find the s-bits and the v-bits. Note that we have retained only n(1− t) bits in X on the RHS
in Fig. 8. Since H has full row rank (because H1 in the previous section had full column rank), n(1− t) x-bits are
enough to solve for the v-bits and the s-bits. We denote this new vector on the RHS in Fig. 8 as X∗T . We remark
that the matrix H is neither the generator matrix of the code C nor the parity check matrix of C⊥.
We will now basically follow the steps described in [14] for efficiently solving the equation in Fig. 8. The matrix
H can be divided into matrices B, T , D and E as in [14] (the matrices called A and C in [14] are not necessary
in our solution) with dimensions nβ×n(1− t− β), nβ× nβ, n(1− t− β)×n(1− t− β) and n(1− t− β)×nβ,
respectively. T is a lower triangular matrix.
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Fig. 9. The matrix Q
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nβ
n(1− t− β)
0
ET−1B+D
Fig. 10. The vector Y
3) Multiplying by the matrix Q: As in [14], we multiply both sides in Fig. 8 by the matrix Q shown in Fig.
9. The result is shown in Fig. 10. The result of the multiplication of the matrix Q with the matrix H can be
precomputed before the actual decoding begins. We now study the matrix-vector multiplication Y = QX∗T . We
need to show that this multiplication is O(n) since we need to do this operation for every received X.
In Fig. 11, we have shown the splitting of the vectors X∗ and Y into vectors X∗1, X∗2 and Y1, Y2, respectively.
The vectors X∗1 and Y1 have dimension 1×nβ, while vectors X∗2 and Y2 have dimensions 1×n(1− t−β). From
Fig. 11, the vectors Y1 and X∗1 are equal. Hence, Y1 can be computed in linear time. Now
YT2 = ET
−1X∗1
T +X∗2
T .
Clearly, T−1X∗1
T can be computed using back-substitution in O(n) time, and the multiplication of this result with
E and the addition with X∗2T are also linear time. Hence, the computation of Y from Q and X∗ is O(n).
4) Solving for vectors S and V: We now turn to Fig. 10. Let the first n(1 − t − β) elements of the vector
[sn(r−t) · · · s1 vn(1−r) · · · v1] in the LHS in Fig. 10 be denoted by U1, and the next nβ elements be denoted by
U2 as shown in Fig. 12. To compute S and V, we now need to solve for U1 and U2 using
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Y2 vectorX
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Fig. 11. The multiplication of Q and X∗
ET−1B+D
B T
nβn(1− t− β)
sn(r−t)
s1
vn(1−r)
v1
0
=
0
y1
y2
yn(1−t)
U1 vector
U2 vector
Y vector
nβ
n(1− t− β)
Fig. 12. Solving for U1 and U2
BU1
T + TU2
T = Y1
T , and (15)
(ET−1B +D)U1
T = Y2
T ,
where Y1 and Y2 are as defined before (in Fig. 11). Solving the second equation first, we get
U1 = (ET
−1B +D)−1Y2.
Though the inverse can be precomputed, the multiplication is not O(n) (in general), since (ET−1B+D)−1 is not
sparse anymore. The complexity of this multiplication is O((1− t− β)2n2). However, if β = 1− t, the vector U1
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is empty and does not have to be computed. From (15),
TU2 = Y1 +BU1.
Since B is a sparse matrix, BU1 can be computed in linear time, and then U2 can be solved in O(n) time by
back-substitution, since T is a sparse lower triangular matrix.
If β = 1 − t the complexity of the entire decoding operation reduces to O(n). Hence, if the code C∗ is a
capacity-achieving erasure-correcting code, then linear time decoding is possible. As we will discuss in the next
section, this is a sufficient condition but not necessary. We now conclude this section with an example of a secrecy
code decoded using the method described in this section.
Example 3: Let C be a (3, 6)-regular LDPC code with block-length n. Let G be the sparse parity check matrix of
C (i.e. the generator matrix of C⊥). The rate of C is r = 1/2. The matrix G1 is chosen to be the parity check matrix
of a (2, 6)-regular LDPC code. Then the code C∗ is an LDPC code with all variable nodes having degree 5 and all
check nodes having degree 6. The rate of C∗ is t = 1/6. The LDPC code C has an erasure threshold α ≈ 0.42.
The code C∗ has an erasure threshold β ≈ 0.55. Thus, the secrecy rate is r − t = 1/3, and 1 − t − β ≈ 0.283.
The decoding complexity is O(n2) because of a multiplication in the decoder by a 0.283n × 0.283n non-sparse
matrix; however, this multiplication is still less complex than a direct decoder that would require a n×n non-sparse
matrix multiplication. The transmitted message is secure across the wiretap channel having erasure probability at
least (1− α) = 0.58.
B. Linear time decodable secrecy codes
We now discuss linear-time decodable secrecy codes. As we saw in the previous sections, a sufficient condition
for the secrecy code to be linear-time decodable is that the code C∗ in Fig. 6 (with parity check matrix H∗) should
be a capacity achieving code on a binary erasure channel so that the row gap in H∗ (i.e. (1− t− β)) is zero. The
authors in [14] have shown that the row gap can also be calculated using the erasure threshold of the transpose
of the parity check matrix (H∗). The transpose of H∗ does not correspond to a non-zero rate code. Nevertheless,
the greedy algorithm that is used to get approximate triangulation in H∗ can also be thought to be the standard
iterative erasure decoding algorithm operating on the transpose of H∗. Let H∗ have degree distribution (λH∗ , ρH∗),
where λH∗ and ρH∗ correspond to the variable and the check nodes, respectively. Then, the transpose of H∗ will
have a degree distribution (ρH∗ , λH∗). In [14], it is shown that the row gap obtained is then (1 − t − δ), where
δ is the erasure threshold of the degree distribution pair (ρH∗ , λH∗). It turns out that, many of the known degree
distributions of good LDPC error correcting codes actually allow linear time encoding (i.e. (1− t− δ) is zero).
In the following example, we will use this idea to construct a secrecy code that allows linear-time decoding (and
encoding since G, G1 in Fig. 6 are sparse anyway). Since some matrices in our example have a few degree-zero
variable nodes, we will use node-based degree distributions as opposed to the typical edge-based degree distribution.
Given an edge-based degree distribution (λ(x), ρ(x)), let v(x) denote the node-based degree distribution of the
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variable nodes. The coefficient of xi in v(x), denoted vi, is the fraction of variable nodes with degree i. Clearly,
v(x) =
∫
λ(x)dx∫ 1
0 λ(x)dx
. (16)
Example 4: We refer to Fig. 6 for this example. Let the code C (with parity check matrix G) have degree
distributions (λG, ρG), where λG(x) = 0.6087x+0.3913x2, and ρG(x) = x6. Thus, the variable degree distribution,
vG(x) = 0.7x
2+0.3x3. Let the matrix G1 correspond to the parity check matrix of a code with degree distributions
(vG1 , ρG1), where vG1(x) = 0.7 + 0.3x, and ρG1(x) = x6. Hence, the degree distributions of H∗ is (λH∗ , ρH∗),
where λH∗(x) = 0.3769x+0.4846x2+0.1385x3, and ρH∗(x) = x6 (using (13) and (14)). The rate of the secrecy
code then is r(λG, ρG)−r(vH∗ , ρH∗) = 0.0429, where r denotes the rate of the corresponding LDPC code. Hence,
our secrecy rate has dropped to 0.0429 from 1− (1− r(λG, ρG)) = 0.6714. The erasure threshold of C turns out to
be 0.2625. Hence this code is secure on a wiretap channel with erasure probability at least (1− 0.2625) = 0.7375
(i.e. secrecy capacity is 0.7375). This secrecy code is linear time decodable.
VI. ERASURE MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER’S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider wire tap systems where both the wire tap channel and the main channel are binary
erasure channels (BEC). Though our results apply with a small modification to systems with DMCs other than the
BEC as the main channel, we restrict ourselves to the BEC case for ease of explanation.
With a BEC as the main channel, the wire tap system is as shown in Figure 13. The wiretapper’s channel is a
BEC(ǫw)
Alice X
Eve
Bob
Z
S Y
BEC(ǫm)
Fig. 13. The BEC wire tap system
BEC with erasure probability ǫw, and the main channel is another BEC with erasure probability ǫm. According to
(3), the secrecy capacity of this system is Cs = ǫw − ǫm, which is positive whenever ǫw > ǫm.
A. Using duals of codes on graphs
As in the noiseless main channel case, we consider using the dual of an LDPC code as the code C for encoding.
Using Theorem 3, security across the wiretapper’s channel can be related to the threshold α of the LDPC code C⊥
over erasure channels. Specifically, if 1− ǫw < α, security is guaranteed with high probability.
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We now turn to the probability of error on the main channel. Suppose we could design the matrix G∗ such that
the overall code C still belongs to an LDPC ensemble with threshold β over erasure channels. Bob can decode x
(and hence the message s) with asymptotically zero probability of error whenever ǫm < β.
In summary, the requirement on the LDPC code C is that it should contain C, the dual of another LDPC code
C⊥. Since the dual of an LDPC code is likely to have a significantly high number of low-weight codewords, the
requirement appears to be contrary to intuition. A very similar code design problem arises in the construction of
quantum error-correcting codes using sparse graphs [16]. After studying several constructions, the authors of [16]
conclude that such codes are difficult to construct and are unlikely to have high thresholds.
B. Using capacity-achieving codes
We now consider a coding method that will eventually depend on capacity-achieving codes for complete security.
We first pick an LDPC code C1 of length n from an ensemble of codes having asymptotic erasure threshold ǫw.
That means, as n→∞, C1 recovers all the erasures on an erasure channel with erasure probability up to at least
ǫw using the standard iterative erasure decoding algorithm. Let the rate of C1 be r1, and let H1 be the parity check
matrix of the code C1. Next we select n(1 − r2) independent vectors from the dual space of C1, where r1 < r2.
The selection is such that the n(1− r2)×n matrix H2 formed by these vectors as rows is from an LDPC ensemble
with erasure threshold ǫm. Let H2 be the matrix whose rows are the rest of the independent vectors in the dual
space of C1. As we will see shortly, we must have ǫw > (1− r2) in order to guarantee some equivocation for Eve.
Let C2 be the code with parity check matrix H2. From capacity considerations, we have
1− r2 ≥ ǫm, and
1− r1 ≥ ǫw.
In our examples, we will construct H2 by picking n(1− r2) rows of H1, and the rest of the rows will be in H2.
Let H2 correspond to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair (λ2, ρ2), and let H2 correspond to a Tanner
graph with degree distribution pair (λ2, ρ2). Using (13) and (14), we see that H1 corresponds to a Tanner graph
with degree distribution pair (λ1, ρ1), where
λ1(x)∫ 1
0 λ1(x)dx
=
1∫ 1
0 λ2(x)dx
∫ 1
0 λ2(x)dx
(
λ2(x)
∫
λ2(x)dx + λ2(x)
∫
λ2(x)dx
)
, (17)
and
ρ1(x) =
∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx +
∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx
ρ2(x) +
∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx +
∫ 1
0
λ2(x)dx
ρ2(x). (18)
We have to choose (λ1, ρ1) and (λ2, ρ2) in such a way that for all i, λ2i and ρ2i are non-negative.
1) Encoding procedure: We now discuss the encoding procedure, which is a little different from the encoding
procedure for a noiseless main channel. Here, Alice starts with a n(r2 − r1)-bit message vector S, and forms a
n(1− r1)-bit vector [0 · · · 0 S] by prefixing n(1− r2) 0’s to S. She now chooses, for transmission, a vector X at
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n(r2 − r1)
n(1− r2)
Fig. 14. The encoding procedure
solution set of H2XT = ST1
for S = S2
solution set of Figure 14
solution set of H2XT = 0
for S = S1
solution set of Figure 14
solution set of H2XT = ST2
Fig. 15. The encoding space
random from the solution set of the equation
H2
H2

XT = [0 · · · 0 S]T . (19)
We illustrate this encoding procedure in Fig. 14. The number of solutions to the equation H2XT = 0 is
2n−n(1−r2) = 2nr2 . For a particular choice of S = S1, the number of solutions to (19) is 2n−n(1−r1) = 2nr1 .
In addition, the solution sets of (19) for different values of S are disjoint as shown in Fig. 15. Therefore, the
solution space of the equation H2XT = 0 splits into 2
nr2
2nr1 = 2
n(r2−r1) disjoint subsets, each corresponding to a
different value of S. Hence, the rate of the secrecy code is (r2 − r1). An interesting observation in the encoding
process is that we are not using the entire space {0, 1}n as in the previous sections where the main channel was
noiseless.
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2) Equivocation across the wire tap channel: In this section, we calculate the equivocation for Eve. Since Eve’s
channel is a BEC with erasure probability ǫw, with probability tending to 1, Eve will have nǫw erasures as n→∞.
If we have ǫw > (1 − r2), using H2XT = 0, Eve must have at least 2n(ǫw−(1−r2)) solutions for X, all of which
are equally likely. All these solutions will differ from each other in the erased positions. Since ǫw is the erasure
threshold of the code having H1 as the parity-check matrix, any submatrix formed using nǫw columns of H1 will
have full column rank [14]. Thus every solution of H2XT = 0 will result in a different value of S, all of which
are equally likely. The equivocation for Eve is then ∆ = n(ǫw − (1 − r2)). If H1 is the parity-check matrix of a
capacity-achieving code on an erasure channel with erasure probability ǫw, ∆ = n(r2 − r1), and the message will
be completely secure from Eve. Clearly, if the erasure probability of Eve’s channel goes up, Eve will still have at
least this much equivocation.
3) Probability of error on the main channel: When Bob receives a vector Y, he first decodes it by using the
standard iterative erasure decoding technique for LDPC codes on the Tanner graph of the code C2. Let the erasure
probability of the main channel be at most ǫm. Then, as n→∞, with probability tending to 1 he will be able to
recover the transmitted word X. Bob then can find out the product H2XT , which is his estimate of the message S.
We now illustrate the codes involved in this coding method with an example.
Example 5: Let C2 be a (3, 6)-regular LDPC code with block-length n. Hence, λ2(x) = x2 and ρ2(x) = x5.
C2 has rate r2 = 1/2. The code C1 is chosen to be another LDPC code with all variable nodes having degree 5
and all check nodes having degree 6. Hence, λ1(x) = x4 and ρ1(x) = x5. C1 has rate r1 = 1/6. It can be seen
from (17) and (18) that, λ2(x) = x and ρ2(x) = x5. The LDPC code C2 has an erasure threshold α∗ ≈ 0.42.
The code C1 has an erasure threshold β∗ ≈ 0.55. Thus, the secrecy rate is r2 − r1 = 1/3, and an equivocation
of n(β∗ − (1 − r2)) = 0.05n is guaranteed across the wiretap channel having erasure probability greater than
β∗ = 0.55. Bob can decode the message with asymptotically zero probability of error on the main channel having
erasure probability at most α∗ = 0.42.
The example above illustrates the main drawback of this coding method. Unless the code C1 is capacity-achieving
(β∗ = 1 − r1), the coding method is not secure even for large n. Note that the equivocation could be reduced
further by a better choice of C1, but the equivocation will go to zero only for capacity-achieving codes.
C. Remarks
We have shown that codes on graphs provide secrecy in erasure wire tap channels with maximum possible
secure information rate. The codes are efficiently implementable in practice. However, if the main channel is
not noiseless, secrecy by forward coding alone appears to require capacity-achieving codes that are difficult to
construct. Alternative models of wire tap channels with parallel error-free public channels are presumably better
for constructing implementable secrecy codes when the main channel is noisy.
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VII. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND BSC WIRETAPPER’S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider a special case of a wire tap channel, where the eavesdropper sees a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with error probability p, denoted BSC(p). The main channel is error free. Using (3), we see that
Cs = 1− Capacity(BSC(p)) = 1− (1− h(p)) = h(p), (20)
where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The wire tap channel and the encoding is shown in Fig. 16. The method of coding is illustrated with the same
Alice
EncoderS
V
X
BSC(pw)
Eve Z
Bob
X
Generator
G
Random bit
Fig. 16. Coding for a BSC wiretapper’s channel.
notation as Section III.
A. Security across a BSC wiretapper’s channel
We let C be an (n, n − k) code and C be the entire space {0, 1}n. For an arbitrary k-bit message S = s, the
transmitted word X ∈ sG∗ +C. Since the cosets of C cover the entire space of n-tuples, Eve’s received vector Z
belongs to some coset of C, say uG∗ +C. If e denotes the error vector introduced by the BSC(p) in the wiretap,
we have for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k,
Prob{Z ∈ uG∗ + C|S = s} = Prob{e ∈ (u+ s)G∗ + C} = Prob{e ∈ w+ C} for some n-tuple w. (21)
We can now state the criterion for selecting the code C to guarantee security of the message S: we choose C such
that for any n-tuple w, we have
Prob{e ∈ w+ C} → 2−k, as n→∞. (22)
Using the above condition in (21), we see that Eve is equally likely to find Z in any coset of C given any
message S = s. Assuming all S = s are equally likely a priori, Prob{Z ∈ uG∗ + C} is independent of u; hence,
Prob{S = s|Z ∈ uG∗ + C} → 2−k, and security is guaranteed.
The LHS of (22) is the probability of the coset w + C. This probability was first studied by Sullivan [17]
and further extended by Ancheta [18], [19]. The following results can be extracted from their studies: (1) The
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requirement of (22) that the probabilities of a code (w = 0) and a coset (w 6= 0) should be approximately equal
can be achieved for large block-length. (2) The properties of the dual of a code plays an important role in the
probability of a coset. We expand on these two results in the next sections to design codes for the BSC wire tap
channel.
B. Choosing the code C: Security criterion
Using the MacWilliams identities [20, Page 127] for the (n, n− k) linear code C, we get
∑
e∈C
xn−wt(e)ywt(e) =
1
2k
n∑
i=0
A′i(x+ y)
n−i(x− y)i, (23)
where A′i is the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C⊥2 . Using x = 1 − p, y = p, and A′0 = 1 in
(23), we get ∑
e∈C
pwt(e)(1− p)n−wt(e) = 2−k + 2−k
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i.
Using the MacWilliams identities [20, Page 137] for the coset w + C, we get
∑
e∈w+C
xn−wt(e)ywt(e) =
1
2k
n∑
i=0
A′i(w)(x + y)
n−i(x− y)i, (24)
where
A′i(w) = αi(w) − βi(w) (25)
with αi(w) equal to the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C⊥2 orthogonal to w, and βi(w) equal
to the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C⊥2 not orthogonal to w. Using x = 1 − p, y = p, and
A′0(w) = 1 in (24), we get ∑
e∈w+C
pwt(e)(1 − p)n−wt(e) = 2−k + 2−k
n∑
i=1
A′i(w)(1 − 2p)
i. (26)
From (25), we see that |A′i(w)| ≤ A′i. We now state the main security criterion as a theorem.
Theorem 4: If
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i → 0, as n→∞, (27)
then Prob{e ∈ w + C} → 2−k for all n-tuples w.
Proof: Since |A′i(w)| ≤ A′i, we get
|
n∑
i=1
A′i(w)(1 − 2p)
i| ≤
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i → 0.
Hence,
|
n∑
i=1
A′i(w)(1 − 2p)
i| → 0.
That implies that the second term in the RHS of (26) can be neglected with respect to the first term 2−k, and the
proof is complete.
The criterion for the selection of C is that the dual C⊥ should have a weight distribution that satisfies (27).
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C. Some code constructions
We provide some examples of codes that satisfy the requirement of (27).
Example 6: (Single parity check codes) The dual of a (n, n − 1, 2) single parity check code is the (n, 1, n)
repetition code with weight distribution A′0 = 1 and A′n = 1. Hence,
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i = (1− 2p)n → 0
as n→∞. However, the secrecy rate 1/n→ 0 for large n. This is an example that was first used by Wyner in [2]
to motivate coding over a wire tap channel.
Example 7: (Hamming codes) The weight distribution of the dual of the [n = 2m− 1, n−m, 3] Hamming code
Hm is A′0 = 1 and A′(n+1)/2 = n. Hence,
n∑
i=1
A′i(1 − 2p)
i = n(1− 2p)(n+1)/2 → 0
as n→∞. As in the previous example, the secrecy rate tends to zero for large n.
The following theorem generalizes the above construction method.
Theorem 5: Let {C(n)} be a sequence of (n, n − kn) codes such that Prob{Detection Error}≤ 2−kn over a
BSC(p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2 and limn→∞{kn/n} < log2(1/(1− p)). Let A′i be the number of codewords of weight i in
the dual code C⊥(n). Then
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i → 0, as n→∞.
Proof: We are given that for the code C(n)
Prob{Detection Error} =
∑
e∈C(n);e6=0
pwt(e)(1− p)n−wt(e) ≤ 2−kn .
Adding (1− p)n to both sides and using the MacWilliams identities, we get
∑
e∈C(n)
pwt(e)(1− p)n−wt(e) = 2−kn + 2−kn
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i ≤ (1− p)n + 2−kn ,
or
n∑
i=1
A′i(1 − 2p)
i ≤ 2kn(1− p)n = 2n(kn/n−log2(1/(1−p))).
Since limn→∞{kn/n} < log2(1/(1− p)) and the LHS above is nonnegative,
n∑
i=1
A′i(1− 2p)
i → 0, as n→∞.
The existence of (n, n − kn) linear codes with probability of detection error less than 2−kn is well known [21,
Section 3.6]. Suppose we find a class of such error detecting codes such that
R = lim
n→∞
kn
n
.
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Then, for large n, the code C(n), when used as the code C over a wire tap channel with a BSC(p) as the wiretapper’s
channel, provides security whenever R < − log2(1− p), or p > 1− 2−R. The maximum possible secrecy rate that
can be achieved by this construction is therefore − log2(1− p).
Codes such as Hamming codes and double error-correcting BCH codes are examples of such error-detecting
codes. However, most known classes of such codes have R = 0.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied the construction of codes that provide security and reliability over a wire tap
channel. Our general construction uses codes that approach capacity over the wire tapper’s channel. We have shown
that this approach achieves secrecy capacity when the wire tap channel is made of symmetric DMCs. Other cases
require a closer study.
A drawback of using capacity-achieving codes is that they are difficult to find and construct except in some
special cases. One such special case is when the wire tap channel is a binary erasure channel. Hence, codes such as
optimized Tornado codes can be used across erasure wiretapper’s channels as described above. However, we have
shown that capacity-achieving codes are not necessary in this case. If a code exhibits a threshold behavior across a
BEC (codes such as regular LDPC codes), its dual can be used effectively over a wire tap channel with a BEC as
the wiretapper’s channel. This result enables the use of codes that can be more easily constructed. Extending the
connections between codes that exhibit a threshold phenomenon and secrecy over a general DMC is an important
area of future work.
When the wiretapper’s channel is a BEC and the main channel is noiseless, we have presented codes that approach
secrecy capacity. To our knowledge these are the first and only such codes.
For the case where both the main channel and the wiretapper’s channel are BECs, we have studied two approaches
for code design. The optimality and secrecy capacity of the constructions need to be studied and explored.
For the case where the wiretapper’s channel is a BSC(p) and the main channel is noiseless, we have shown
that codes with good error-detecting properties provide security. The capacity of this construction is − log2(1− p),
which is less than the secrecy capacity h(p). Capacity-approaching codes will probably be graph-based. Use of
graph-based codes for the BSC wiretapper’s channel is a subject for future study.
APPENDIX I
EXISTENCE OF RELIABLE ENCODERS
In this section, we determine a random coding bound on the probability of error Prob{U 6= Uˆ} in a manner
following Gallager [22, Section 5.6]. Let x be a vector of n input symbols, y a vector of n main channel output
symbols, and z a vector of n wire tap channel output symbols. We let the output alphabet of the main channel be
{1, 2, · · · , Jm} denoting a symbol by jm. The eavesdropper on the wire tap channel is assumed to have unlimited
power to process the received word z. We let the output alphabet of the wire tap channel be {1, 2, · · · , Jw} denoting
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a symbol by jw. Let Tn(y|x) and Sn(z|x) be the transition probabilities for the main channel and wire tap channel,
respectively. Let TSn(y, z|x) be the joint distribution.
We now define a random code ensemble for the coding method of Section II-B. Let Qn(x) be an arbitrary
probability assignment on the set of length n input sequences. A set of ML words is chosen pairwise independently
from the set of length n input sequences according to Qn(x). The words are arranged in an M ×L array indexed
by a pair of coordinates u ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} and v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L}; each word is denoted xm, where m = (u, v).
Each row is considered to be the code Cu i.e. Cu = {xm′ : m′ = (u′, v′);u′ = u}.
Let us assume that a message u is to be transmitted by Alice. Let us further assume that the word xm with
m = (u, v) is chosen for transmission from Cu. Let y and z be the received vectors for Bob and Eve, respectively.
We will upper bound the probability of an event E, which captures both the security and reliability constraints.
The event E is the union of the following two events:
1) Event Am′ : an xm′ for m′ = (u′, v′) 6= m = (u, v) with u 6= u′ is chosen in the code such that Tn(y|xm′ ) ≥
Tn(y|xm). This event captures the reliability requirement.
2) Event Bm′ : an xm′ for m′ = (u, v′) 6= m = (u, v) is chosen in the code such that Sn(z|xm′) ≥ Sn(z|xm).
This event captures the security requirement.
The probability of E averaged over the ensemble for the m = (u, v)-th word is
PE,m =
∑
xm
∑
y
∑
z
Qn(xm)TSn(y, z|xm)Pr{E|m,xm,y, z} (28)
Using a modified union bound,
Pr{E|m,xm,y, z} ≤

∑
u6=u′
Pr{Am′}


ρ1
+

 ∑
u=u′,v 6=v′
Pr{Bm′}


ρ2
,
for 0 ≤ ρ1, ρ2 ≤ 1. Now,
Pr{Am′} =
∑
xm′ :Tn(y|xm′)≥Tn(y|xm)
Qn(xm′)
≤
∑
x
Qn(x)
Tn(y|x)
s1
Tn(y|xm)s1
, s1 > 0.
Similarly,
Pr{Bm′} ≤
∑
x
Qn(x)
Sn(z|x)
s2
Sn(z|xm)s2
, s2 > 0.
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Using the simplifications in (28),
PE,m ≤
∑
xm
∑
y
∑
z
Qn(xm)TSn(y, z|xm)
[
(M − 1)L
∑
x
Qn(x)
Tn(y|x)
s1
Tn(y|xm)s1
]ρ1
+
∑
xm
∑
y
∑
z
Qn(xm)TSn(y, z|xm)
[
(L− 1)
∑
x
Qn(x)
Sn(z|x)
s2
Sn(z|xm)s2
]ρ2
= (M − 1)ρ1Lρ1
∑
y
[∑
xm
Qn(xm)Tn(y|x)
1−s1ρ1
] [∑
x
Qn(x)Tn(y|x)
s1
]ρ1
+(L− 1)ρ2
∑
z
[∑
xm
Qn(xm)Sn(z|x)
1−s2ρ2
] [∑
x
Qn(x)Sn(z|x)
s2
]ρ2
.
Using si = 1/(1 + ρi), we get a version of Theorem 5.6.1 in Gallager [22]. Following Gallager [22, Section 5.6]
further for the case of discrete memoryless channels, we let
Qn(x) =
n∏
i=1
Q(xi),
where the input vector x = [x1 x2 · · ·xn] in terms of its components, and Q(k), k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} is an
arbitrary probability assignment on the input alphabet. Similarly, we let Tn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 T (yi|xi) and Sn(z|x) =∏n
i=1 S(zi|xi). Converting to exponential relationships, we get
PE,m ≤ exp{−n[E1(ρ1, Q)− ρ1R1]}+ exp{−n[E2(ρ2, Q)− ρ2R2]}, (29)
where ML = enR1 ; L = enR2 ;
E1(ρ1, Q) = − log

 Jm∑
jm=1
[
K∑
k=1
Q(k)T (jm|k)
1/(1+ρ1)
]1|ρ1 ; and (30)
E2(ρ2, Q) = − log

 Jw∑
jw=1
[
K∑
k=1
Q(k)S(jw|k)
1/(1+ρ2)
]1|ρ2 . (31)
Note that the secrecy rate of a code from the ensemble is Rs = R1 −R2. Using a distribution Pr{m} in (29), we
get
PE ≤ exp{−n[E1(ρ1, Q)− ρ1R1]}+ exp{−n[E2(ρ2, Q)− ρ2R2]}, (32)
The random coding exponent for the wire tap channel is defined as follows:
Ew(R2) = max
0≤ρ2≤1
max
Q
[E2(ρ2, Q)− ρ2R2]. (33)
Let Q2 be the distribution on the input symbols that maximizes the random coding exponent Ew(R2). To satisfy
the security constraint of Section II-C, we restrict ourselves to ensemble of codes with input symbol distribution
Q2(k). We can now define another random coding exponent for the main channel as follows:
Em(R1) = max
0≤ρ1≤1
[E1(ρ1, Q2)− ρ1R1].
Using the random coding exponents in (32), we get the following theorem.
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Theorem 6: For an ensemble of codes using the maximizing distribution Q2,
PE,m ≤ exp{[−nEm(R1)]}+ exp{[−nEw(R2)]};
PE ≤ exp{[−nEm(R1)]}+ exp{[−nEw(R2)]}.
We know that Ew(R2) > 0 for 0 ≤ R2 < Cw, where Cw is the channel capacity of the wiretapper’s channel.
Hence, Theorem 6 says that there exists a code in a suitable ensemble such that the security constraint can be
satisfied (each Cu can approach capacity on the wire tapper’s channel) with arbitrary accuracy by increasing the
block-length; at the same time, the same code can satisfy the reliability constraint with arbitrary accuracy provided
the rate R1 is such that Em(R1) > 0. From the properties of random coding exponents [22, Section 5.6], we see
that Em(R1) > 0 if
R1 < I(Q2;S) =
K∑
k=1
Jw∑
j=1
Q2(k)S(jw|k) log
S(jw|k)∑
iQ2(i)S(jw|i)
.
Hence, the maximum secrecy rate achievable by a code from the ensemble is I(Q2;S)−Cw. We immediately see
that for the special case of a wire tap channel considered in (3) secrecy capacity is achievable by some code in
the ensemble. In particular, if both the main channel and wire tapper’s channel are symmetric, secrecy capacity is
achievable.
APPENDIX II
DEGREE DISTRIBUTION: PROOFS FOR (13) AND (14)
Let λG(x) =
∑
i λix
i−1
, ρG(x) =
∑
i ρix
i−1
, λG1(x) =
∑
i λ1ix
i−1
, ρG(x) =
∑
i ρ1ix
i−1
, λH∗(x) =∑
i λ∗ix
i−1
, ρH∗(x) =
∑
i ρ∗ix
i−1
.
Let E1 and E2 be the total number of 1s in the matrices G and G1, respectively. From the definition of degree
distribution, the number of 1s in G and G1 from rows of weight i equals ρiE1 and ρ1iE2, respectively. Therefore,
ρ∗i (fraction of 1s in H∗ from rows of weight i) is given by
ρ∗i =
ρiE1 + ρ1iE2
E1 + E2
=
E1
E1 + E2
ρi +
E2
E1 + E2
ρ1i. (34)
The number of weight i columns in G and G1 equals
λi
i
E1 and
λ1i
i
E2, respectively. The total number of columns
in G or G1, n, can be written as
n =
∑
i
λi
i
E1 =
∑
i
λ1i
i
E2.
Using the above relations in (34) for E1 and E2 and replacing
∑
i
λi
i
(respectively ∑i λ1ii ) with ∫ 10 λG(x)dx
(respectively ∫ 10 λG1(x)dx), we get (14).
To prove (13), we use the node-based degree distribution of LDPC ensembles. The coefficient of xi in∫ x
u=0 λG(u)du∫ 1
0
λG(x)dx
(35)
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equals the probability that a randomly chosen column of G has weight i. Similarly, the coefficient of xi in∫ x
u=0 λG1(u)du∫ 1
0
λG1(x)dx
(36)
equals the probability that a randomly chosen column of G1 has weight i. Note that the polynomials in (35) and
(36) are generating functions of independent random variables denoting the weight of a randomly chosen column
in G and G1, respectively. Since the weight of a column of H∗ equals the sum of the weight of the column in G
and the weight of the column in G1 and the two weights in G and G1 are independent, we have∫ x
u=0
λH∗(u)du∫ 1
0
λH∗(x)dx
=
(∫ x
u=0
λG(u)du∫ 1
0
λG(x)dx
)(∫ x
u=0
λG1(u)du∫ 1
0
λG1(x)dx
)
.
Differentiating the above equation gives (13).
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